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During recent years, in the European Union, the issue of job security have 
become very important. The member states, in fact, are confronted with a 
“double bind”, that can be summed up as the flexibility-security nexus. 
On one hand, there is a demand for increased flexibility in order to 
reinforce the competitiveness of firms, sectors and countries. On the other 
hand, workers demand job security, wage security and employability 
(Wilthagen, 2003). This nexus can be addressed with policy strategy in 
which both objectives are represented in a more or less integrated manner. 
More precisely, flexicurity could be defined as a policy-strategy that 
attempts to enhance on one hand, the flexibility of the labor market and, 
on the other, security notably for weak groups inside and outside the labor 
market(Wilthagen, 2003). 
“Member States will facilitate the adaptability of workers 
and firms to change, taking account of the need of both 
flexibility and security […]. Member States will review and, 
where appropriate, reform overly restrictive elements in 
employment legislation that affect labor market dynamics 
[…].”  (Employment Guidelines for Member States, EU, 
2003) 
Looser rules about hiring and firing may make easier for employers to 
hire workers, thus improving the job prospects of new entrants to the work 
force such as young people (i.e flexibility). At the same time, easing these 
restrictions can also make people, who have already a job, worry more 
about the risk of losing it (i.e. security). The question is controversial and 
the difficulty to find effective policy strategies is reflected by the history 
of the institutional framework of the national labor markets
3. 
From the beginning of the 1980’s in Spain the high rate of unemployment 
pushed towards the possible benefits that would derive from increasing 
flexibility in the labor market. In this view, the first reform introduced in 
Spain, concerning in the liberalization of the temporary contracts in 1984, 
had as the main goal an increase in flexibility. In the middle of the 
nineties, the high percentage of temporary workers  and the high turnover 
determined a pressing need for combining flexibility and security. After 
                                                 
3 See Oecd (2004) for further considerations about the costs and benefits of greater job 
security. 
  2the poor results obtained in 1994, a new reform in 1997, aimed at 
increasing stability. 
This reform, differently with respect to the majority of the reforms 
introduced in Western Europe in the nineties, was not a reform “at the 
margin”. In fact, instead of introducing further elements of “pure” 
flexibility (i.e. new kinds of temporary contracts), it tried to increase the 
use of permanent contract by reducing the firing costs. Moreover, this 
reform can be viewed as a “natural experiment”
4. In particular, a “natural 
experiment” occurs when some exogenous event – like a change in the 
government policy – change the environment in which agents operate and 
the impact of this change can be evaluated comparing the mean before 
and after the event (Besley and Case, 1994)
5. The evaluation of the impact 
of this kind of reforms on labor market has stimulated research
6 and the 
nature of  “natural experiment” of the Spanish reform represented an 
interesting base for several studies
7. 
This paper evaluates the impact of 1997 reform in Spain on the perceived 
job security of the workers. A study of this reform is particularly 
compelling because, in contrast with the majority of the other European 
reforms, it marks a sharp change for some groups (i.e. young workers, old 
workers, the long term unemployed, women under-represented in their 
occupations and disabled workers), while leaving other groups unaffected. 
This presents an opportunity to set up a treatment-control design that may 
provide more reliable estimates (Kugler et al., 2003). 
The novelty of this study is the focus on the impact of the reform on the 
satisfaction of the workers with respect to job security. In fact, the change 
in the level of job satisfaction among the workers due to changes in the 
institutional regime is not frequently evaluated despite its increasing 
importance. There is, instead, an increasing attention towards the 
                                                 
4 I consider this reform a natural experiment because it presents the typical characteristics attributed 
to a natural experiment, i.e. it’s an “exogenous” event that affects some targeted groups while leaving 
unaffected some other groups. 
5  This last feature is particularly valuable because, normally, one reason the causal effect of 
institutional changes has been difficult to establish is the lack of sharp changes or reforms that can be 
used for measurement. Most institutional changes in the European context have been either so gradual 
or general that it is difficult to identify control groups that can be used to establish a non-reform 
baseline necessary for comparison (Kugler et al., 2003). 
6 See, for example, Blanchard and Landier (2002), Dolado et al. (2001), Arellano (2004). 
7 See, for example, Kugler et al. (2003), Dolado et al. (2001), Arellano (2004).  
  3determinants of the level of job satisfaction and job security
8 and less 
attention about how these levels are affected by the macro aspects of the 
labor market
9. In fact, elements like the rate of unemployment, the level of 
Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) and Unemployment Insurance 
(UI), the previous institutional and economical frameworks affect the 
perceived job security of the workers, the behavior of the employers 
significantly; the change on the behavior of the employees could, 
indirectly, affect the results of the reform. Moreover, changes in the level 
of perceived job security have several potential broad implications related 
to investment in job-specific skills, job mobility, consumption and 
savings, health job-related issues. 
In the empirical analysis data drawn from the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP) for Spain form 1995 to 2000 are used. The 
ECHP is a cross-sectional longitudinal survey focusing on household 
income and living conditions. 
In the evaluation analysis, I combine the propensity score matching with a 
fixed effect estimator. The latter gives the possibility to exploit the panel 
characteristics of the data set while the propensity score matching 
technique, applied to the treated and untreated groups in 1995, addresses 
the problem of heterogeneity between treated and control groups. 
Given the subjective nature of the variable of interest and the risk of some 
unobserved heterogeneity, some robustness check are performed. First of 
all, I check if there are some evidence of reform’s effect on other 
satisfaction variables. Secondly, in order to test the robustness of the fixed 
effect estimations I perform the analysis on the control groups. To 
conclude, to test in a different way the robustness of the findings, I will 
estimate the treatment effect using a propensity score matching DID 
estimator.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief description of 
the institutional framework of the Spanish labor market and the 1997 
reform. Section 3 presents the data and the empirical model. Section 4 
presents the estimation results. Section 5 presents the robustness checks. 
Finally, section 6 offers some concluding remarks. 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Clark (1997,1998), Clark et al. (1996,2001), Givord and Maurin (2003), Manski 
and Straub (1999). 
9 See, for example, Clark and Postel-Vinay (2005), Clark et al. (2001). 
  42.  The Institutional Framework 
The performance of the Spanish labor market is, among the OECD 
countries, one of most disappointing, with an unemployment rates, during 
the 1990s, exceeding 20%. Accordingly, the employment creation has 
been one of the primary challenges facing the Spanish government since 
1980 (Martìn, 2002). 
The main peculiarity of the actual institutional framework of the Spanish 
labor market finds its origins in 1980, with the approval of the Worker’s 
Statute (Ley del Estatuto de los Trabajadores). This law defined the two 
main institutional features of the Spanish system of labor market relations 
which, despite several reforms, still remain operative: a high degree of 
employment protection and the predominance of collective bargaining at 
the provincial/industrial level
10. 
The most significant attempt to reduce the strictness of EPL was the 
liberalization of fixed-term employment contracts in late 1984. This 
reform introduced a whole variety of temporary contracts which, by 
contrast to the permanent one, entailed much lower severance payments, 
if any, and whose termination couldn’t be appealed (Dolado et al., 2001). 
Subsequently, in the middle of 90s, two labor market reforms (1994 and 
1997) aimed to reverse the effects of the liberalization of 1984 
liberalization, trying to reduce the proportion of temporary employment. 
In the early nineties, in effect, one third of the Spanish labor force worked 
under temporary contracts (32.5%) and more than 90% of all new signed 
contracts were temporary
11. In Spain, at that moment, there was a pressing 
need for combining flexibility with security. 
The two main provisions of the reform in 1994 limited the use of 
temporary contracts to seasonal jobs and a widened the conditions for 
“fair” dismissal. The reform had a weak impact on the Spanish labor 
market. On one side, in fact, employers continued to hire workers under 
temporary contracts for all kinds of jobs. On the other side, the approval 
for dismissals for “economic reasons” continued to be granted mainly 
when there was an agreement between employers and workers, while the 
labor courts continued to rule most dismissals as unfair. 
At the beginning of 1997, the unemployment rate was 21.5% and there 
was a high level of insecure employment. In this context, the employer 
confederation (CEOE) and the major unions (UGT and CC.OO) reached 
an agreement to reform the system of employment contracts and the 
                                                 
10 See Jimeno and Toharia (1993) for further details. 
11 The percentage of temporary contracts in Spain was one of the highest in Europe. See Martìn 
(2002) for further details. 
  5structure of collective bargaining. This reform aimed to reducing the use 
of temporary contracts by increasing the incentives for the firms to hire 
workers from certain population groups using permanent contracts. In 
practice, the reform introduced a new permanent contract with lower 
firing costs in case of unfair dismissals. 
Since 1998, the Spanish government introduced several measures related 
to working time flexibility. In particular, with the Agreement on 
Promoting Stable Part Time Employment on 13th November 1998, a 
serried of measures were introduced to promote stable part time 
employment, permanent intermittent employment and replacement 
contracts combined with early retirement. 
More recently, the 2001 reform suppressed the ceiling for the number of 
part time hours and introduced a more flexible distribution of working 
hours groups. 
2.1  The Reform in 1997 
Until 1997 all the reforms introduced in Spain, and in the Western 
European countries as well, attempted to increase flexibility through the 
liberalization of temporary contracts. People refers to them as reforms “at 
the margin” because of the failure on introducing a fundamental 
liberalization. Instead, they may increase the wages of permanent workers 
(as a consequences of the creation of a dual labor market), having some 
undesirable consequences for output, employment and segmentation of 
labor market
12 (Kugler et al., 2003). 
The 1997’s reform, conversely, represented the first attempt of the 
Spanish government to correct the distortions of the labor market due to 
the large increase in temporary contracts of the previous years and, at the 
same time, to introduce new elements of flexibility, reducing the dismissal 
costs for permanent contracts. 
This reform had three main features. First, it promoted the use of 
permanent contracts to hire 18-29 years old, long term unemployed, 
unemployed adults, disabled persons and temporary workers; secondly, it 
reduced the fixed-term contracts; finally, it promoted combined 
theoretical and practical education among the young to facilitate their 
entry into the labor market. 
                                                 
12 See, for example, Blanchard and Landier (2002), Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002), Dolado et al. 
(2002), Hunt (2002), Garcia-Fontes and Hopenhayin (1996),  Jimeno and Toharia (1993,1996), 
Bertola and Ichino (1995), Bentolila and Dolado (1994); and Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) for 
theoretical and empirical analysis of the effect of temporary contracts.. 
  6Some of the main incentives introduced by the government were: the 
reduction of the social security contributions
13; the reduction of dismissal 
costs during a period of two years for new permanent contracts
14; the 
limitation of the number of fixed contracts that can be offered; the 
introduction of new training policies. 
In practice, the 1997 reform reduced the dismissal costs for unfair 
dismissals by about 25% and payroll taxes between 40% and 90% for 
newly signed permanent contracts and for conversions of temporary into 
permanent contracts, after the second quarter of 1997, for workers under 
30 years of age, over 45 years of age, the long term unemployed, women 
under-represented in their occupations and disabled workers. Severance 
payments for unfair dismissals of newly signed contracts for the workers 
in the target groups were reduced from 45 to 33 days pay per year of 
seniority and the maximum was reduced from 42 to 24 months. The 
payroll taxes reduction
15 was 40% for workers under 30 years of age and 
for long term unemployed, 60% for workers above 45 years of age and 
women under-represented in their occupations and between 70% and 90% 
for disabled workers. Furthermore, in some cases, the reduction of payroll 
taxes were reduced after the second year of employment (Kugler et al., 
2003). 
3.  Data and methodology 
3.1.  Data 
Data are from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) from 
1995 to 2000
16. The ECHP is a cross-sectional longitudinal survey 
focusing on household income and living conditions: information on 
health, education, housing, migration, demogra-phics, employment 
characteristics and satisfaction are provided
17. 
                                                 
13 Employers are entitled to these reductions when they hire persons from one of the target groups and 
offer them a permanent contract. 
14 These incentives have the aim to remove the barriers which prevent employers from offering such 
contracts. 
15 In Spain, the average payroll tax rate was about 33% of the salary of the worker. The uniform 
payroll tax rate was differentiated by age group and kind of contract. For example, for young workers 
it was the 28.3% of the salary. The reduction of  40%  implied a new payroll tax rate of about 16%. 
16 We exclude the first (1994) and the last wave (2001): the first one because there are no workers 
hired with permanent contracts; the last one because, in these year, another reform  that modifies and 
extends the one occurred in 1997, has been introduced. 
17 See Seracchi (2002) for further details. 
  7A panel has been extracted from the ECHP for Spain including men and 
women between 16 and 65 years of age, who were employed
18. The panel 
presents an attrition, as typically in the household panel, due to non 
response or changes in the life of the respondents (death, moving, etc.). In 
Peracchi (2002) the estimated average attrition for Spain is 10%. 
The question on job security are inserted in a wide range of questions 
regarding personal satisfaction of the ECHP questionnaire. The exact 
wording is as follow: 
Question: “How satisfied are you with your present job or 
business in terms of job security? Using the scale 1 to 6, 
please indicate your degree of satisfaction. Position 1 means 
that you are not satisfied at all, and 6 that you are fully 
satisfied.” 
The typical formulation of this kind of questions contains a subjective 
element regarding the meaning of “satisfied” or even “job security”, that 
could vary from one person to another (Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2005)
19.  
The expected impact of this reform could be ambiguous. First, the 
reduction of firing costs may increase the probability to access to 
permanent contracts
20, affecting positively the level of job security. 
Secondly, the lay off procedure became “easier” and this could make the 
“new permanent” workers (e.g. individuals hired with permanent 
contracts after 1997) feel less secure. 
Tab.2 and Tab.3
21 describe the composition of the sample and of the 
treatment and control groups considered in the analysis, respectively. The 
treatment and the control groups differ for some characteristics, as sex, 
marital status, level of education, kind of contract (permanent or 
temporary), sector(public or private), experienced past unemployment: the 
so-called observable pre-treatment characteristics that require a proper 
control. 
 
                                                 
18 The questions related to job satisfaction is asked only to employees. See Tab 2 in the Appendix B 
for the composition of the sample.  
19  This implies that it could be not compared across individuals or countries in a obvious way. 
Considering the kind of estimation I am going to exploit, this element has to be taken in account. 
20 See Kugler et al. (2003). 
21 See Appendix B. 
  83.2. Identification  Strategy 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of the reduction on 
dismissal costs on the level of perceived job security. 
The variable of interest is the perceived job security of the worker that, as 
all the satisfaction variables, is a categorical ordinal variable (it takes the 
value 1-6: not satisfied-fully satisfied), with an underlying ordinal utility 
that is transformed in cardinal linearizing the outcome variable: any 
translation into numbers is suitable, provided that the order of the 
“values” is preserved (Van Praag et al., 2003). Each observation of the 
ordinal output variable is set equal to the expected mean of a truncated 
normal distribution
22. 
Two different treatment groups are identified: the first group is composed 
by individuals under 30 years, the second is composed by individuals 
above 45 years of age
23. In each of the two treatment groups the 
individuals are temporary workers and they are entitled, after the reform, 
to be hired with the new permanent contracts (i.e. permanent contracts 
with lower firing costs). Four control groups are constructed. The first is 
composed by individuals with less than 30 years of age, working with a 
“traditional” permanent contract; the second by temporary workers with 
an age between 30 and 36 years of age; the third by permanent workers 
with more than 45 years of age; finally, the fourth by temporary workers 
with an age between 38 and 44 year. 
The first treatment group (i.e. temporary workers with less than 30 years 
of age) is compared, first, with permanent workers with less than 30 years 
of age and, secondarily, with temporary workers with an age between 30 
and 36 years. In the same way, the second treatment group (i.e. temporary 
workers with more than 45 years of age) is compared with the control 
group composed by permanent workers with more than 45 years of age 
and with the group of temporary workers with an age between 38 and 44 




                                                 
22 See Appendix A for further details. 
23 We don't consider the long term unemployed because we cannot observe them. We exclude also 
the women under-represented in their work place because they may be self-selected (Kugler et al., 
2003). We exclude also the disabled workers because of a lack of observations. 
  9Tab. 1 : Treatment and control groups comparisons. 
Treatment groups  Control groups 
Below 30 with temporary contracts  Below 30 with permanent contracts 
Below 30 with temporary contracts  Age 30-36 with temporary contracts 
Above 45 with temporary contracts  Above 45 with permanent contracts 
Above 45 with temporary contracts  Age 38-44 with temporary contracts 
 
To each treatment group two control groups are assigned. In the first case 
treated and untreated have the same age, but different contracts 
(temporary and permanent respectively); in the second case, treated and 
untreated have the same temporary contract but different age
24. 
Figures 1 and 2, show that the treatment group composed by temporary 
workers with less than 30 years of age presents a change in the level of 
perceived job security starting in 1997. After the reform, this group 
presents an increasing level of job security. The first control group (i.e. 
permanent workers with less than 30 years of age), instead, presents a 
more stable pattern along all the period. The second control group, finally, 
has a less stable pattern in the period of analysis, without showing a 
precise trend. 
Considering the second treatment group (see figure 3 and 4) there is no 
evidence of some effect on the level of perceived job security induced by 
the reform. In fact, in the observed period, the perceived job security of 
the target group doesn’t change, as well as the level of job security of the 
first control group (i.e. permanent workers with more than 45 years of 
age). As before, the pattern of the second control group is less stable than 









                                                 
24 The first control group is composed by individuals who are in a better situation than the treated; the 
second control group is composed by individuals who are in a worst situation than the treated. 
  10Fig. 1: Average level of job security for the “below 30” treatment group versus the “below 30” control 
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Note: ECHP dataset. 
 
Fig. 2: Average level of job security for the “below 30” treatment group versus the “age 30-36” 
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  11Fig. 3: Average level of job security for the “above 45” treatment group versus the “above 45” control 
ote: ECHP dataset. 
Fig. 4: Average level of job security for the “above 45” treatment group versus the “age 38-44” 
ote: ECHP dataset 
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  12The presence of observable differences between the treatment and the 
control groups requires the use of a set of control variables: demographic 
variables
25,variables related to job conditions and income
26. 
3.2.  Estimation strategy 
3.3.  The traditional Differences-in-Differences estimator 
In a natural experiment, the most used estimation strategy is based on the 
Differences-in-Differences (DID) estimator. The DID allows a 
comparison between a pre-treatment and a post-treatment outcome for 
those individuals exposed to the treatment, using an untreated comparison 
group (the so-called control group) to control for temporal variations in 
the outcome that is not due to the treatment exposure (Abadie, 2005). 
The basic DID framework can be described as follow. Let Y(i,t) be the 
outcome of interest for individual i at time t. The population is observed 
in a pre-treatment period and a post-treatment period. Let’s denote t=0 in 
the former case and t=1 in the latter case. Between these two periods a 
fraction of population is exposed to the treatment. Similarly, let’s denote 
D(i,t)=1 if individual is exposed to the treatment and D(i,t)=0 otherwise 
(Abadie, 2005). 
The conventional DID estimator is often specified using a linear 
parametric model: 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) t i t i tD t i D t t i Y , , , , 3 2 1 0 ε γ γ γ γ + + + + =    (1) 
3 ˆ γ  is the Differences-in-Differences estimator: 
31 , 1 1 , 0 0 , 1 0 , ˆ () ( Dt Dt Dt Dt 0 ) γ γγ γγ == == == == =−−−     (2) 
that measures the effect of the treatment. 
The DID estimator is based on a crucial and critical assumption. The error 
term has to uncorrelated with the other variables (e.g. cov( , , ) 0 ii Dt i ε = ). 
                                                 
25 Sex, age, age squared, level of education (high, medium and low), marital status, immigrant status, 
number of children. 
26 Professional level (manager, intermediate and blue collar), sector (private or public), economic 
sector, working hours (full time or part time), size of the firm, experience in the labor market, 
experience of past unemployment, length of the unemployment spell, income of the household. 
  13This means that the average outcomes of the treated and the untreated, in 
absence of treatment, would have followed parallel paths over time 
(Abadie, 2005). 
This is implausible if the pre-treatment characteristics, associated with the 
dynamics of the outcome variable, are unbalanced between treated and 
control groups. As a consequence the estimator will be biased (Abadie, 
2005). 
As shown by Heckmann et al. (1998), this bias can be split in three parts: 
a first component due to the non overlapping support (i.e. the populations 
have completely different characteristics, X), a second due to the different 
distributions of X, within the two populations, a third due to the 
differences in outcomes that remain even after controlling for the first two 
biases
27. 
The differences in observed characteristics, in fact, might create non 
parallel dynamics in the perceived job security for the treated and the 
untreated. The bias due to differences in the characteristics and their 
distribution within group might become relevant and the evaluation 
problem could not be addressed with the traditional DID. 
Looking at figures 1 to 4, I could notice that in the pre-reform period the 
treatment and the control groups don’t seem to follow parallel paths in all 
the comparisons considered. These empirical evidence, then, support the 
fact that the basic assumption of the DID estimator is not valid. 
3.3.2  The propensity score matching and the fixed effect 
estimator 
Two main aspects have to be considered to set up the evaluation strategy 
in a proper way. The first relates to the heterogeneity between and within 
treatment and control groups. The second refers to the panel 
characteristics of the sample. 
Given these considerations, the empirical strategy used is composed by 
three steps. First, the panel has been balanced in order to have the same 
individuals in all the years considered. In this way, I address the problem 
related to the heterogeneity over time, due to the possibility that in 
different years the treatment and the control groups could be composed by 
                                                 
27 The latter is the selection bias and it is due to the selection of the unobservables. This kind of bias 
can become less relevant if, as in my case, the data are administrated with the same questionnaire and 
the treated and the untreated reside in the same labor market (Heckmann et al., 1997). 
  14different individuals. Secondly, to control for heterogeneity between 
groups, the treatment and the control groups have been matched on the 
basis of a set of pre-treatment observable characteristics, using a 
propensity score matching method. 
The propensity score is defined by Rosembaum and Rubin (1983) as the 
conditional probability of receiving some treatment given the pre-
treatment characteristics: 
() { } ( ) X D E X D X P | | 1 Pr = = ≡        (3) 
where   is the indicator of exposure to treatment and X is the 
multidimensional vector of the pre-treatment characteristics. 
{} 1 , 0 = D
Several methods are available in order to match the treatment and control 
groups on the basis of the propensity score
28. I use the Kernel Matching 
method that matches all the treated with a weighted average of all 
controls, with weights that are inversely proportional to the distance 
between the propensity score of the treated and the control (Becker and 
Ichino, 2002). In particular, the kernel weight function is: 
()

























                                                
        (4) 
where G(.) is a kernel function and   is a bandwidth parameter.   n
Formally, two hypothesis are needed in the matching process in order to 
derive, successively, the treatment effect. The balancing property of 
treatment variables
a
29, as well as, the unconfoundeness given the 
propensity score must hold
30 (Becker and Ichino, 2002). 
The use of the propensity score addresses properly the issue of common 
support and miss-weighting
31. In fact, the balancing property of the 
propensity score implies that observations with the same propensity score 
 
28 The most common methods are: Nearest Neighbor Method, Radius Matching, Kernel Matching and 
Stratification Matching. 
29 If P(X) is the propensity score, then  |() D XP X ⊥ . 
30 Suppose the assignment to the treatment is unconfounded, i.e.  (CIA – unconditional 
independence assumption). Then, assignment to treatment is unconfounded given the propensity 
score, i.e.   
10 ,| YY DX ⊥
10 ,| ( YY DPX ⊥ )
31 See Heckmann et al. (1997). 
  15must have the same distribution of observable characteristics 
independently of the treatment status (Becker and Ichino, 2002). 
Furthermore, the matching method links to each treatment a control unit 
having the closest propensity score. 
Eventually, the treatment effect of the reform on the perceived job 
security of the worker, using a fixed effect estimator on the matched and 
balanced sample is estimated. 
In practice, we estimate the following equation: 
, , 1997 ii i i t i t YD D P o s t i t α δγ β ε =++ + + (5) 
where  i α  indicates the individual effect,  t δ  indicates the time effect,  , it 
is a dummy variable that assumes value 1 when the individual is treated 
and 0 otherwise,  1997 is a dummy that assumes value 1 if I observe 
the post reform period and 0 otherwise, 
D
Post
β  is the parameter of interest that 
measures the effect of the reform. The key assumption of this approach is 
that the unobservables  i α  (i.e. individual effects) are time invariant 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). 
The fixed effect approach has the attraction of allowing one to use panel 
data to establish causation under weaker assumption than those needed to 
establish causation with cross-sectional data or with panel data models 
without fixed effects, such as pooled models and random effects models 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). 
4.  Results 
The aim of the reform introduced in Spain in 1997 was to reduce the 
instability of the labor market through a new restrictive permanent 
contract. The expected effect on the level of perceived job security might 
be ambiguous. On one hand, an increase in the level of job security for the 
target groups, due to an increasing probability to be hired with a 
permanent contract, is expected. On the other hand, the reduction of firing 
costs, that accompany this contract, can introduce a higher level of 
insecurity among the workers. In practice, the final effect of the 
introduction of these new restrictive permanent contract depends on the 
concern of the workers with respect the higher probability to be hired and 
the higher probability to be fired. 
  16To analyze the impact of this reform I use a fixed effect estimator after 
having matched treatment and control groups on the basis of the 
propensity score technique.  
The aim of combining these two techniques is to solve the problem of 
heterogeneity of the treatment and the control groups and to use the panel 
characteristics of the sample as well. In fact, the variable of interest is a 
measure of the subjective perception of the workers about the possibility 
to lose their job and several worker’s characteristics as age, gender, kind 
of contracts, past experiences of unemployment could affect significantly 
the perceived job security (see, for example, Clark (1997, 1998), Clark et 
al. (1996, 2001, 2005)) . 
For this reason, I first balance the panel, then we obtain the propensity 
score
32 and we identify, for each participant, all non participants who 
match on the propensity score
33, using kernel weights. Finally, on these 
matched samples I estimated the treatment effects of the reform using a 
fixed effect estimator. A separate analysis for blue-collar workers has also 
been performed. 
Table 4 reports the estimation results. 
The reform has a positive and significant effect for all the temporary 
workers with less than 30 years of age, in both the comparison performed. 
This results is coherent with the literature on the relationship between job 
security and strictness of EPL. In Clark and Postel-Vinay (2005), for 
example, the authors, using data from ECHP for 12 European countries, 
found a negative relationship between job security and job protection, i.e. 
workers feel less secure in countries where the jobs are more protected. 
Also in Spain, the reduction of strictness of EPL seems to have introduced 
a higher sense of security. On the other hand, my results are coherent also 
with the conclusions of Kugler et al. (2003), who investigate the impact of 
the reform on the probability of transition between different states. They 
noticed an increasing probability, in particular for young individuals, to 
move from temporary to permanent employment. 
There is no effect instead on the perceived job security for the workers 
more than 45 years old. This is explained by the fact that for this group 
together with an higher probability to move from temporary to permanent 
                                                 
32 To estimate the propensity score (See Becker and Ichino (2002)) we use a set of demographic 
variables and some related to the job conditions of the individuals. See footnotes 22 and 23. 
33 See Leuven and Siamesi (2003). 
  17positions, there is an higher probability of transition from permanent 
employment to non employment as well
34. 
These results are confirmed also by the analysis performed only on the 
blue-collar workers. The temporary workers with less than 30 years of age 
show an increase in the perceived job security due to the introduction of 
the reform in both comparisons. Table 5 shows the estimation results. 
 
5.  Sensitivity analysis 
5.1.  The outcome variable 
The outcome variable of the analysis – the perceive job security of the 
workers – is subjective and this might rise some doubts about the 
estimation results. In other words, it might be that the effect captured by 
the estimator is affected by subjective bias even after controlling for 
individual characteristics. 
One way to check for the existence of a possible subjective bias is to 
explore the overall satisfaction with respect to job and other dimensions 
related or unrelated to the changes introduced by the 1997 reform. 
The ECHP questionnaire contains a set of satisfaction questions related to 
different aspects of the job conditions. I plot the yearly average level of 
different satisfaction variables for the first treatment group – i.e. 
temporary workers with less than 30 years of age – and the first control 
group, composed by permanent workers with less than 30 years of age
35. 
In figure 5, the overall job satisfaction variable that comes out from the 
following question: 
How much are you satisfied with your work or main activity? 
The answers are ranked from 1 to 6, where 1 means not satisfied and 6 
fully satisfied. 
The overall job satisfaction on the treated is increased starting from 1997 
but there is no a specific change after the 1997 reform. The control group, 
on the other side, shows a similar increasing pattern on the level of job 
satisfaction, since the year of the reform. Moreover, the differences in the 
level of job satisfaction among the two groups is not so wide as in case of 
the perceived job security. 
                                                 
34 See Kugler et al. (2003). 
35 In the paper, for simplicity reasons, I propose this check only for the first treatment-first control 
groups comparison and only for some satisfaction variables. For more detailed information contact the 
author. 
  18Fig. 5: Average level of job satisfaction for the “below 30” treatment group versus the “below 30” 
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Note: ECHP dataset. 
Fig. 6: Average level of distance satisfaction for the “below 30” treatment group versus the “below 














1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Treatment Control
 
Note: ECHP dataset. 
 
 
  19The satisfaction related to distance from the workplace is interesting 
because it’s totally unrelated to the reform. The question is: 
How satisfied are you with your present job in terms of distance to 
job/commuting? 
Figure 6 makes clear that there are non changes in the level of the 
satisfaction after the 1997 reform both for treatment and control groups 
and, moreover, they both follow the same pattern. 
Fig. 7: Average level of working time satisfaction for the “below 30” treatment group versus the 
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Note: ECHP dataset. 
Figures 7 and 8 represents the yearly average level of satisfaction related 
to working time and working/environment conditions respectively. The 
two question are: 
How satisfied are you with your present job in terms of working times 
(day time, night time, shifts, etc.)? 
How satisfied are you with your present job in terms of working 
conditions/environment? 
Also in these cases, there are two clear changes in variables trajectories 
after the 1997 reform and the two groups follow the same pattern and 
  20have almost the same level in respect to both working time and working 
conditions satisfaction. 
Fig. 8: Average level of environment satisfaction for the “below 30” treatment group versus the 
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Note: ECHP dataset. 
At the end, the reform’s impact estimated on the perceive job security of 
the workers seems to capture the real effect and not a subjective bias, 
given that the other job satisfaction variables are not effected by the 
reform. 
5.2.  The fixed effect analysis of the control groups 
The application of the fixed effect estimation technique to the control 
groups allows to test the correctness of the group construction and the 
possible selection bias. In case of correct set up of our analysis, the 
coefficient γ  - i.e. the coefficient related to the treatment/control dummy 
– should be 0 and there should not be any treatment effect, i.e. β  not 
significantly different from 0. 
More specifically, I estimated the equation (5) twice. In the first case, D 
should be equal to 1 if individuals are permanent workers with less than 
30 years of age (i.e. first control group related to first treatment group) 
and 0 if individuals are permanent workers with more than 45 years of age 
(i.e. first control group related to second treatment group). In the second 
case, D should be equal to 1 if individuals are temporary workers with age 
  21between 30 and 36 (i.e. second control group related to first treatment) 
and 0 if individuals are temporary workers with age between 38 and 44 
years (i.e. second control group related to second treatment). In both 
cases, the coefficient γ  and β  are not significantly different from 0
36. 
 
5.3.  The propensity score matching DID 
 
The robustness of the results obtained with the fixed effect estimator is 
checked by performing the same analysis using a propensity score 
matching DID estimator. First, I balanced the panel in order to have the 
same individuals each year. Secondly, in each year I matched treatment 
and control groups on the basis of the propensity score
37, using kernel 
matching technique. Finally, I evaluated the differences-in-differences for 
couples of years (i.e. each couple is composed by one year after and one 
year before the reform). This procedure has been done for each treatment-
control comparison. The structure of the analysis is as follows: 
Tab. 1bis: Differences-in-Differences structures 
DID Structure 
DID98-95 ATT1998 – ATT1995
DID99-95 ATT1999 – ATT1995
DID00-95 ATT2000 – ATT1995
DID98-96 ATT1998 – ATT1996
DID99-96 ATT1999 – ATT1996
DID00-96 ATT2000 – ATT1996
 
Table 6 shows the estimation results. The treatment effects estimated with 
the propensity score matching DID confirm the results obtained with the 
fixed effect analysis. There is a positive and significant effect for the 
temporary workers with less than 30 years of age in both the comparisons 
with the two control groups in almost all the cases. There are no effects 




                                                 
36 For detailed results contact the author. 
37 For the variables used in the definition of the propensity score see footnotes 22 and 23. 
  226.  Conclusion 
 
This paper uses the labor market reform, that occurred in Spain in 1997, 
introducing new restrictive permanent contracts characterized by lower 
dismissal costs and lower payroll taxes. The 1997 reform represents a 
“natural experiment” and allows us to set up a research design to evaluate 
its impacts on the perceived job security of some target groups of Spanish 
workers. 
The introduction of these new restrictive permanent contracts could 
produces a double effect. On one side, the probability to be hired with a 
permanent contract is higher – and this rises the sense of security of the 
workers – on the other, it becomes easier to be fired and this, of course, 
makes the workers feel insecure. Estimates using ECHP data for Spain 
suggest that the reform increased the perceived job security for workers 
with less than 30 years of age and there were no effect for workers with 
more than 45 years of age. 
The results are robust even using the blue-collar workers’ sample and the 
propensity score matching DID technique. 
In previous studies
38 the relationship between job security and strictness 
of EPL is found to be negative. This means that high level of Employment 
Protection is associated with low level of security and vice versa. 
Our analysis, then, confirms that in Spain, the introduction of looser EPL 
did increase the job security and changed the distribution of the perceived 
job security from less to more satisfied position in the satisfaction 
ranking. 
                                                 
38 See, for example, Clark and Postel-Vinay (2005). 
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  27Appendix A: Truncated Normal Distribution 
Let us suppose that the random variable X is N(0,1), and we consider the 
truncated distribution  . The mean of this truncated distribution is 
given by






c X at ordinate c
X E =
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If the truncation if from above, so that we consider the distribution 
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If the distribution is doubled truncated, so that we consider  2 1 c X c ≤ ≤ , 
then: 
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1 2
In the analysis, X is the ordered variable that describe the level of job 
security,  1 and  2 c  are respectively the level 1 and 6 of the satisfaction 
ranking. Following the previous procedure a new continuous variable (i.e 
security_pols) is created, simply setting: 
c
1 security_pols (security_sat | security_sat ) E ii i - 1 µ µ =< ≤







39 See Maddala (1986) for further details. 
  28Appendix B: ECHP for Spain 
Tab. 2: Sample composition before matching 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
N. Obs. 4,400 4,255 4,194 4,135 4,141 4,030
Age < 30 1,279 1,221 1,236 1,217 1,201 1,127
Age 30-45 1,968 1,922 1,824 1,810 1,819 1,829
Age >=45 1,153 1,112 1,134 1,108 1,121 1,074
Disabled worker 427 478 434 438 394 378
Female 1,546 1,496 1,470 1,526 1,534 1,519
Cohabitant or married 2,923 2,839 2,814 2,741 2,700 2,656
I m m i g r a n t 8 07 66 36 45 46
N. Children>0 2,205 1,987 1,827 1,772 1,703 1,607
High education 1,213 1,242 1,159 1,285 1,418 1,425
Low education 2,281 2,132 2,125 1,933 1,865 1,793
Manager or professional 659 662 674 629 684 657
Blue-collar 2,641 2,501 2,581 2,554 2,524 2,452
Experience>0 2,756 2,707 2,716 2,790 2,888 2,905
Permanent Contract 2,701 2,677 2,651 2,644 2,754 2,717
Public sector 1,149 1,132 1,032 964 984 917
Part time 299 262 271 278 272 240
Industry 1,404 1,350 1,440 1,387 1,389 1,369
Services 2,762 2,633 2,577 2,578 2,605 2,506
Firm size 0-99 2,475 2,376 2,915 2,922 2,917 2,870
Experienced past unemployment 1,700 1,689 1,752 1,682 1,648 1,516
Long spell of past unemployment 652 623 647 555 507 434
3
Note: ECHP dataset. 
Tab. 3: Composition of the sub-samples before and after the 1997’s labor market reform (before 
matching) 
Before After Before After Before After Before After
Female 39.8 42.7 36.1 37.3 35.3 35.7 27.1 30.2
Cohabitant or married 29.1 32.9 79.5 72.3 85.7 83.6 85.9 83.9
Immigrant 2.6 1.7 2.0 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.3
N. Children >0 27.8 23.2 64.3 52.5 56.6 72.4 39.7 30.39
High education 25.2 31.7 34.2 37.7 33.6 36.2 24.2 27.7
Low education 48.7 41.6 43.1 39.6 45.8 42.8 64.5 57.5
Manager or professional 7.2 9.9 16.0 14.9 22.7 23.2 17.3 20.8
Blue-collar 68.3 69.3 57.4 60.0 50.4 42.8 62.1 58.2
Experience >0 83.2 77.3 83.4 89.8 47.5 65.2 34.4 40.2
Permanent contract 21.8 42.5 40.1 66.5 49.2 76.7 47.0 81.4
Public sector 14.8 12.0 29.3 23.3 35.7 32.5 30.2 30.7
Part time 8.9 8.3 6.4 6.0 5.3 5.5 4.6 5.0
Industry 33.9 36.6 29.5 32.6 30.6 30.3 36.6 34.6
Services 62.2 59.7 67.4 64.1 60.6 66.5 59.4 60.9
Firmsize 0-99 81.3 78.9 73.5 71.8 65.3 64.5 67.0 64.7
Experienced past unemployment 56.8 51.1 47.2 47.5 27.2 36.2 20.4 22.5
Long spell of past unemployment 17.8 14.3 18.3 14.3 12.0 13.9 8.3 8.9
Income of the household >0 91.3 92.0 74.2 78.2 69.3 73.0 77.6 79.3
N. Obs. 3,599 4,484 2,813 3,455 2,557 2,797 3,135 3,708
Below 30 Age 30-36 Age 38-44 Above 45
Note: ECHP dataset 
  29Appendix C: Estimation results 

















N. Obs.      
Treatment 422  260  154  139 
Control 458  385  345  95 
















R-squared 0.1646 0.1441 0.1767 0.0035 
Note: The standard errors are indicated in parenthesis. * corresponds to 1%, ** to 5% and *** to 10% 
level of significance. 
 

















N. Obs.      
Treatment 339  312  147  132 
Control 287  203  221  84 
















R-squared 0.1593 0.0925 0.1809 0.0049 
Note: The standard errors are indicated in parenthesis. * corresponds to 1%, ** to 5% and *** to 10% 
































N.Obs treat.  165  164  57  6 









N.Obs treat.  158  133  77  6 







N.Obs treat.  154  -  84  18 








N.Obs treat  168  151  45  - 








N.Obs treat  161  120  65  - 






N.Obs treat  157  -  72  - 
N.Obs control  138  -  179  - 
Note: The bootstrapped standard error are indicated in parenthesis. * corresponds to 1%, ** to 5% and 
*** to 10% level of significance. 
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